The Policy Lens

Tag: arms race

  • Back to 1991: Why a Second Nuclear Arms Race Is Already Underway.

    On October 29, president Donald J. Trump announced that the U.S. would revive its Cold War-era hobby of testing nuclear weapons. The president framed the move as a response to rising threats from rivals, particularly the the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation. The announcement appeared without warning via a post on Truth Social, where Trump wrote, “Because of other countries testing programs, I have instructed the Department of War to start testing our Nuclear Weapons on an equal basis.” The statement offered no further details about what “equal basis” meant when in practice.

    The lack of detail is where the trouble begins. Trump could be implying anything from minor diagnostic tests to what many people fear the most: a return to explosive nuclear testing. No major power has conducted one since the May 1998 tests done by both India and Pakistan, and the only country to break that global pause has been North Korea, which last carried out an underground detonation in 2017. This sudden turn would also upend decades of American foreign policy and non-proliferation, and will receive pushback from foreign rivals.

    To truly understand the stakes we must look at every possibility.

    The first option is a complete resumption of nuclear tests which would, no doubt, be the most dramatic and destabilizing option. Ending the pseudo moratorium era would undermine any remaining credibility of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, which the United States is yet to ratify. It would also set off alarms in Beijing and Moscow. Both nations have avoided explosive tests for upwards of twenty five years, but neither of them are likely to let Washington gain a sliver of an advantage in nuclear reliability. An arms race wouldn’t be an if, but be a when.

    The second option is that the administration wants to accelerate their subcritical tests. Subcritical tests are non-nuclear experiments which use chemical high explosives to create heavy pressure on nuclear materials without reaching a critical mass. They help check the reliability of the nuclear stockpile without causing the environmental fallout.

    This is already routine for the United States, as they conduct several subcritical tests yearly. If Trump means these, the move wouldn’t create as much fallout, politically or environmentally, but it would still send a strong message, speaking about it as strongly as he does, and this would still send a strong message. China and Russia could interpret it as the U.S. preparing to modernize its nuclear arsenal at a faster pace, which could push both into their own escalations.

    The third options is much simpler. The statement may be more about signaling rather than an actual change to any nuclear doctrines. Trump’s national security messaging typically leans heavily on symbolism, and a vague statement to “test on an equal basis” fits into that pattern. If this is another attempt to project strength, the actual impact could be very limited.

    The main problem here is that the ambiguity becomes very dangerous. Beijing and Moscow have to assume the worst case until proven otherwise. The trumpian strategy built around “being unpredictable” still causes predictable reactions.

    Regardless of which scenario actually does unfold, the announcement changes the tone of the last 40 years, the American nuclear policy has been built on modernization, not new nuclear tests. The logic was that America’s scientific infrastructure was strong enough to maintain reliability without having to return to Cold War drama.

    Trump’s statements tear up that decades lasting bipartisan consensus. Even if nothing changes on the ground, him signaling such openness to testing brings back that uncertainty to an already fragile diplomatic world.

    A return to testing would destabilize global deterrence by giving every other country a reason to follow after. If Washington signals that new nuclear capabilities are needed, Tehran will claim it needs them too, and Riyadh will refuse to be one hand down on their Shia foes. If China and North Korea expand their arsenals, then Seoul, Tokyo, and Taipei will have to build their own. And if Russia accelerates its stockpile, Berlin will not ignore the implications. Once one domino tips, the others fall fast.

    Our Take

    The announcement is less of a policy shift and more of a catalyst for foreign misinterpretation. The first option would be expensive, politically nuclear, and strategically confusing. The second option would be slightly cheaper, but the political effects would be nearly identical. And if the statement was simply rhetoric, that creates its own risk. Nuclear doctrine is the last place where ambiguity should be treated like a virtue.

    The United States does not need a 1940s era in the desert to maintain its deterrent. It needs stable doctrine and predictable communication with rivals. Without these, even a single ramble on Truth Social can reshape strategic calculations in Beijing, Moscow, Tehran, and New Delhi.

    For now, Washington’s policy still stays unclear. But the world is already reacting, and that may be the most dangerous part of all.

  • The Golden Dome: America’s Most Ambitious Military Venture Since the Manhattan Project

    THAAD loaded with the Patriot missile system

    Nearly forty years after Ronald Reagan’s “Star Wars” dream promised to protect the United States from nuclear hellfire, the idea has returned, bigger, flashier, and far less clear. President Donald Trump’s new “Golden Dome” initiative, aims to create an Israeli Iron Dome-style missile defence system which would protect the continental U.S. from drones, hypersonic missiles, and intercontinental strikes. The name is gaudy, which is in character for this administration, but the ambition is not as absurd as some push it to be, the true danger is in its obscurity.

    To understand the stakes, we must know what the “Golden Dome” really is. It includes things that already exist, such as the Patriot batteries, THAAD, along with others. On top of that it includes things that have been in the works for years now, such as enhanced missile detection & interception tools.

    Multi-Layered Defence System

    However, there are new pieces to this puzzle. Just as Trump has revived old Neo-Conservative ambitions, he continues to echo Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush’s vision for a Strategic Defensive Initiative system, that are orbital weapons that would destroy incoming ballistic and hypersonic missiles during their boost phase, long before they can come close to their target.

    With the scope now clear, we can understand how it will be one of the most ambitious (and expensive) projects to date. It could lead to major changes in American military strategy. Critics claim that it is another pyre for tax-payer funds. However its supporters, which are often non-MAGA, claim that something like this is long overdue.

    Now President Trump’s plan is named after Israel’s Iron Dome, but are they truly similar? The answer is a resounding no. The Israeli Iron dome protects a small country against small missiles sent over by Hamas or by Palestine Islamic Jihad, not a vast country facing hypersonic missiles by China.

    Israeli Iron Dome in Usage

    Now let us leave the hypothetical, how would this actually be done? America’s Department of War says it has a rough sketch, but is yet to release any details. What is known is that the Golden Dome would not be a single system, but a complex network of technologies.

    The cheapest option for the supposed Golden Dome is one focused on drones, cruise missiles, and planes; this alone would still cost $250 billion. The most lavish idea is designed to block threats of almost all kinds, including the ICBMs used by North Korea. This could amount to almost $3.6 trillion, according to the American Enterprise Institute.

    The involvement in space would drive much of the cost. Even a basic orbital system would have to be enormous, since interceptors can’t always be positioned over the right regions. The only way to compensate for that is to have sheer quantity.

    But is this a Good Idea?

    Critics claim the Golden Dome is an unrealistic and economically destabilizing proposal which revives the failure of Reagan’s “Star Wars” program. They claim that the system’s $175 billion estimate is vastly understated, given that similar space-based interceptor projects cost well over $500 billion. The U.S. already possesses limited defense systems that they argue is more suitable for the much more likely small-scale threats, and a nationwide shield against intercontinental missiles is technologically impossible within three years.

    Beyond the cost and practicality, critics also say the plan risks undermining nuclear deterrence by giving rivals like Russia and China another reason to expand their arsenals, which could trigger a fresh arms race.

    Defense Intelligence Agency’s assessment of current and future missile threats to the U.S.

    However, proponents see it much differently. They argue that the Golden Dome represents a necessary evolution in U.S. defense strategy amid rapidly advancing missile and drone technologies. They contend that existing systems like THAAD and Aegis were designed for limited threats from the time where the biggest aggressor to the U.S. was loosely banded terrorist organizations and insurgents grabbing onto the last stockpile of weapons they had. These were not in the emerging era of hypersonic and long-range precision strikes from adversaries such as China, Russia, and North Korea. Supporters also claim that investing in a comprehensive, layered missile defense network would not only deter attacks but also drive more innovation in defense industries. To them, “Golden Dome” is less of a reckless gamble than a long-overdue modernization incentive which would ensures the U.S. can meet future threats.

    Our Take

    The Golden Dome is undeniably an impressive idea on paper, but it has that all too common risk of turning into an overbuilt symbol of security instead of the promised long term defense solution. In a situation where the lowest estimates already stretch into the hundreds of billions, without even considering the systems staggering maintenance expenses, it is just very hard to justify a nationwide system when the credible threats could be addressed with much less. We believe that a realistic approach should focus on protecting major metropolitan and strategic areas rather than the whole country at once. The best course of action is concentrating these advanced systems around population centers, military bases, and infrastructure hubs, this would be far cheaper, faster to build, and far more likely to work as intended. For now, the Golden Dome seems less like a shield for America and more like a flashy symbol of power meant to project strength, rather than truly ensure it.